The relative role of religiosity in radicalization: how orthodox and fundamentalist religiosity are linked to violence acceptance
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The role of religiosity in radicalization is a topic of intense debate. To avoid essentializing religion, it is crucial to include a variety of factors that can explain radicalization beyond religiosity. The present study aligns with this approach by building upon the three Ps of radicalization (push, pull, personal factors). It examines the relative role of various forms of religiosity (pull factors) in radicalization within the context of social structure, perceived deprivation (both push factors), and demographic variables (personal factors). We analyzed previously collected data comprising a sample of 1,048 Muslims with Turkish migration background in Germany. Acceptance of active and reactive violence as indicators of radicalization with demography, social-structure position, perceived deprivation, and different forms of religiosity (individual, collective, orthodox, fundamentalist religiosity) were used as predictors. Individual religiosity was a protective factor against reactive violence when controlling for fundamentalism. Fundamentalism emerged as the strongest predictor of the acceptance of reactive violence. Both fundamentalism and orthodox religiosity were positive predictors of active violence. However, these latter effects should be interpreted with caution due to the naturally low acceptance of active violence. Finally, the deprivation-radicalization association was stronger for participants scoring higher on fundamentalism, while medium to high orthodox religiosity was the key factor connecting deprivation to radicalization. Implications are delineated regarding practical strategies, specifically formulated for addressing feelings of deprivation within minority contexts.
Introduction
The role of religion in radicalization is the subject of ongoing and highly controversial debate, not only in public discourse and politics but also in the social sciences (de Graaf and van den Bos, 2021). This debate focuses on the factors explaining radicalization, which can be classified into push, pull, and personal factors, also known as the 3Ps of radicalization (Vergani et al., 2020). Some scholars deny that religiosity plays any role as a pull factor of radicalization, whereby pull factors are understood as “group-level sociocognitive explanations” (Vergani et al., 2020, p. 857). Instead, radicalization is believed to be caused by push factors that target social structural explanations (especially low education and unemployment; e.g., Piazza, 2011; Della Porta, 2013) and, perceived deprivation (especially discrimination and marginalization; e.g., Schiffauer, 1999; Piazza, 2012), or personal factors that refer to biographical explanations (especially demographic factors; Borum, 2015; Koomen and van der Pligt, 2015).
Others, such as Six (2005), Pratt (2010), and Koopmans et al. (2021) insist on taking statements by extremists seriously, emphasizing their justification of actions through their religion, and demand more research on this question (Horgan, 2014). Religiosity certainly is of interest for radicalization research because it relates to various aspects of ideology: its psychological aspects, such as the ideological frames through which the world is understood (Snow and Byrd, 2007; Borum, 2015); its underlying religious-moral values (Ginges et al., 2011); its transcendent ideological aspects, such as the promise of rewards in the afterlife (Kiper and Sosis, 2021); and, more simply, associated group cohesive functions (Ginges et al., 2009). Together, these aspects may indeed render religion, or certain forms of religiosity, an important pull factor of radicalization.
Although radicalization is not restricted to religious groups (e.g., left- and right-wing radicalization), it can be found among various religious groups, such as Christians and Jews (e.g., Ginges et al., 2009; Koopmans et al., 2021). However, the prevailing academic discussion centers around Muslim radicalization (Williamson and Demmrich, 2024) especially in the context of migration (e.g., Beller and Kröger, 2018; Jakubowska et al., 2021). Most probably, the phenomenon of radicalization influences a small minority among them (e.g., Goli and Rezaei, 2011). Nevertheless, Islam and Muslims are often perceived as an exceptional case in terms of radicalization in academia (Wright, 2016) and Islam is often discriminated against as fanatic, radical, and prone to violence in the wider public (Pollack, 2014; Yendell and Pickel, 2019).
While our paper reflects on the relationship between different forms of religiosity and acceptance of violence, it utilizes a sample of Muslims (with a Turkish migration background) in a minority context (Germany),1 leveraging the heightened focus on Islam within such contexts, thereby facilitating the availability of such datasets. Therefore, the present study undertakes a secondary analysis of a previously collected dataset of Muslims with a Turkish migration background in Germany. A general objective of this paper is to build on effects observed in prior studies involving other religions and/or contexts (e.g., Ginges et al., 2009; Koopmans et al., 2021), but also to discuss results that may deviate from previous findings, offering insights specific to the sample under scrutiny.
Specifically, our study aims to analyze the associations between different forms of religiosity and radicalization. Thus, the study uses religiosity as a pull factor of radicalization and researches its relative prediction against the background of both push and personal factors (Vergani et al., 2020). Building upon previous studies, different forms of religiosity are examined and existing knowledge is expanded by placing greater emphasis on reactive forms of violence in addition to the previously researched active forms. Finally, it is examined whether certain forms of religiosity can fuel the alleged deprivation-radicalization-nexus.
Content retrieved from: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/social-psychology/articles/10.3389/frsps.2024.1406688/full.
